vtjames742 said:
Both Duelfer and Kay found Iraq had "a clandestine network of laboratories and safe houses with equipment that was suitable to continuing its prohibited chemical- and biological-weapons [BW] programs," the official said. "They found a prison laboratory where we suspect they tested biological weapons on human subjects."
Although that headline from Duelfer's report is accurate. The details in the report reveal a bit more, such as 'ISG has no evidence that IIS Directorate of Criminology (M16) scientists were producing CW or BW agents in these laboratories.' and 'Exploitations of IIS laboratories, safe houses, and disposal sites revealed no evidence of CW-related research
or production". The report does say "The IIS program included the use of human subjects for testing purposes." But hardly makes the leap that they tested BW's on humans since there is no evidence of BW's being produced in the first place. (I love when the press quotes unnamed officials that merely paraphrase public info with their own slant.)
(
https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/Comp_Report_Key_Findings.pdf)
vtjames742 said:
They found equipment for "uranium-enrichment centrifuges" whose only plausible use was as part of a clandestine nuclear-weapons program. In all these cases, "Iraqi scientists had been told before the war not to declare their activities to the U.N. inspectors," the official said.
From the Iraq Survey Group's conclusions in their final report on WMD's -
"Iraq did not possess a nuclear device, nor had it tried to reconstitute a capability to produce nuclear weapons after 1991."
"Post-1991, Iraq had neither rebuilt any capability to convert uranium ore into a form suitable for enrichment nor reestablished other chemical processes related to handling fissile material for a weapons program."
"
Available evidence leads ISG to judge that Iraq’s development of gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment essentially ended in 1991."
"It does not appear that Iraq took steps to advance its pre-1991 work in nuclear weapons design and development."
The ISG's conclusions on Iraq's nuclear weapons' development is here -
Iraq Survey Group Final Report
vtjames742 said:
New research on BW-applicable agents, brucella and Congo-Crimean hemorrhagic fever, and continuing work on ricin and aflatoxin that were not declared to the United Nations.
From the ISG report- "Despite evidence of Iraq’s intent to develop more dangerous biological agents after Desert Storm, ISG uncovered no indications that biological agents were researched for BW purposes post-1991, even though Iraq maintained—and in some cases improved—research capabilities that could have easily been applied to BW agents."
The entire text of ISG's conclusions on BW development is here -
Iraq Survey Group Final Report
From the same report and page- "Dr. Rihab supported inclusion of
brucella in Iraq’s BW program and actively supported pre-Desert Storm research to that end. That initiative, however, appears to have ended in the wake of the first Gulf war."
"ISG has investigated, but has found no information to suggest that BW-related research into the contagious agent acute
hemorrhagic conjunctivitis (AHCV) occurred after the alleged cessation of the Iraqi viral BW program in early 1991"
"The evidence surrounding Iraq’s investigation of ricin for BW purposes is unclear, and thus ISG can offer no definitive conclusion. It is clear that Baghdad had weaponized
ricin in at least a limited fashion prior to the first Gulf war. There is at least some evidence of post-war IIS involvement in ricin research and possible human testing, but ISG developed no definitive information with which to confirm reports of post-war production."
The report does not state a conclusion for aflatoxin individually but it's overall BW conclusion that no research into BW's is the overriding factor.
vtjames742 said:
A line of unmanned aerial vehicles, UAVs, or drones, "not fully declared at an undeclared production facility and an admission that they had tested one of their declared UAVs out to a range of 500 kilometers [311 miles], 350 kilometers [217 miles] beyond the permissible limit." .
"Evidence available to ISG concerning the UAV programs active at the onset of OIF indicates these systems were intended for reconnaissance and electronic warfare. However, this evidence does not rule out the future possibility of adapting these UAVs for CBW delivery if the Iraqi Regime had made a strategic decision to do so. "
Iraq Survey Group Final Report
vtjames742 said:
"Continuing covert capability to manufacture fuel propellant useful only for prohibited Scud-variant missiles, a capability that was maintained at least until the end of 2001 and that cooperating Iraqi scientists have said they were told to conceal from the U.N."
"Plans and advanced design work for new long-range missiles with ranges up to at least 1,000 kilometers [621 miles] -- well beyond the 150-kilometer-range limit [93 miles] imposed by the U.N. Missiles of a 1,000-kilometer range would have allowed Iraq to threaten targets throughout the Middle East, including Ankara [Turkey], Cairo [Egypt] and Abu Dhabi [United Arab Emirates]."
In addition, through interviews with Iraqi scientists, seized documents and other evidence, the ISG learned the Iraqi government had made "clandestine attempts between late 1999 and 2002 to obtain from North Korea technology related to 1,300-kilometer-range [807 miles] ballistic missiles -- probably the No Dong -- 300-kilometer-range [186 miles] antiship cruise missiles and other prohibited military equipment," Kay reported. .
This is mostly correct. That being said, their procurement effrots with North Korea never resulted in delivery and their research never resulted in actual production. It still was a violation of UN sanctions.
vtjames742 said:
• Found: 1.77 metric tons of enriched uranium .
I have to assume this is in reference to “Low-Enriched” uranium dioxide (2.6% 235U) 1,767 kg that was purchased in 1982 from Italy and under IAEA safeguards.
vtjames742 said:
•• Found: 1,500 gallons of chemical weapons .
From the ISG report again - "While a small number of old, abandoned chemical munitions have been discovered, ISG judges that Iraq unilaterally destroyed its undeclared chemical weapons stockpile in 1991."
Iraq Survey Group Final Report
vtjames742 said:
• Found: Roadside bomb loaded with sarin gas .
"ISG assesses that Iraq and Coalition Forces will
continue to discover small numbers of degraded
chemical weapons, which the former Regime mislaid
or improperly destroyed prior to 1991."
"Polish Forces recovered 41 Sakr-18 rockets in June
and July 2004. Of the rockets tested one contained
residual sarin, five contained petroleum and a pesticide,
and the remainders were empty. ISG believes
that the Iraqis who provided the rockets added the
pesticide because we have no previous reporting
indicating that Iraq weaponized pesticides."
http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/DuelferRpt/Addendums.pdf
vtjames742 said:
• Found: 1,000 radioactive materials--ideal for radioactive dirty bombs .
I can find no mention of this in official governemnt reports
vtjames742 said:
• Found: 17 chemical warheads--some containing cyclosarin, a nerve agent five times more powerful than sarin .
There are numerous isaolated findings of remaining chemical munitions in Iraq, detailed here -
Iraq Survey Group Final Report
However, the key finding of the ISG still stands - "While a small number of old, abandoned chemical munitions have been discovered, ISG judges that Iraq unilaterally destroyed its undeclared chemical weapons stockpile in 1991."
vtjames742 said:
I assume most people know what a paper tiger is? Saddam made the mistake of making himself look more dangerous than he really was. It is his claims to have weapons that drove everyone's belief that he did. The reason most cannot be accounted for is 1. Some were moved 2. Some were buried 3. Much of them only existed on paper- Saddam put himself in a corner and paid the price- how do you prove you have disposed of something you never had? It is his fault and no one elses.
Although there is no evidence of either movement or burial, your assessment of Saddam being a paper tiger is certainly accurate. His veiled threats of possessing WMD's ultimately led to easily protraying him as a threat. Whether it was used by certain politicians as an excuse for invasion or a sincere desire to eliminate that potential threat will probably have to be left up to history and probably not important to America's need to move forward.
